War of 1812 Bicentennial

Chapter II

Character of the boundary-line of Canada—Her inland waters—Hudson Bay, the St. Lawrence, and the great lakes—Naval combined with military power essential for her defence—The United States of America.

The Dominion of Canada is very largely bounded by water. It includes all the Arctic islands—except Greenland, which is Danish—also Anticosti, Prince Edward Island, and Cape Breton, on the Atlantic, with Vancouver and Queen Charlotte Islands on the Pacific.

In tracing below, in sufficient detail for our purpose, her boundary-line,¹, we must consider the British possession of newfoundland, with its dependency of Labrador, as if within that line, although Newfoundland, as yet at all events, is not technically a portion of the Dominion. In connection with defence she cannot be separated from it.

What is to be especially noted² is that the boundary-line or frontier of Canada, thus understood, is on the north and east formed by the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans, running round past Hudson Straits and Nova Scotia to the Bay of Fundy; on the south it marches from this bay, with that of America, completely across the continent. At first it separates New Brunswick from Maine, then, bending westward, and afterwards southward,¹ it eventually strikes the St. Lawrence between Montreal and Kingston, following thence the navigable channel of that river through the great lakes of Ontario, Erie, Huron, and Superior, to Lake of the Woods, whence, striking the 49th parallel of latitude, it runs along that to the Pacific Ocean. On the west it is formed by that sea as far north as Alaska, and thence to the Arctic Ocean by United States territory again.²

Thus for some 4,00 miles, from the Bay of Fundy westward to the Pacific, and from the southern point of Alaska to the Arctic Sea, the Canadian boundary adjoins the United States.

But if we look at the course of the St. Lawrence from Lake Superior to the Atlantic, we shall see that that river, with the vast lakes through which it passes, forms for defensive purposes a water frontier to the south of Canada for a distance of about halfway from the Pacific to the Atlantic—i.e. from the west of Lake Superior to Gaspé, on the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

Therefore, in addition to her ocean frontier to the west, north, and east, Canada, along the eastern half of her southern border, possesses in effect a water frontier of between 1,800 and 1,900 miles,¹ across which, from Montreal eastward, owing to the actual boundary-line running south of the St. Lawrence, she can push her outposts on Canadian territory beyond that river towards Lake Champlain.

What such a length of water frontier as from 1,800 to 1,900 miles means, can be realized by our mentioning that if, from the mouth of the Thames, a line were drawn round the United Kingdom—i.e., northward round Scotland, westward round Ireland, and southward along the English Channel to the Thames again—it will come to just about this distance.

Let us now touch briefly upon the character of the inland waters of Canada.

Hudson Bay, about 1,000 miles long by 600 broad—i.e., larger than the Black Sea, the Baltic, or the Adriatic—communicates with the Atlantic through Hudson Straits. This bay has hitherto been used comparatively little for commercial purposes by settled Canada, being too remote in accessibility, though not in mere distance; but now it is about to be connected by rail with the great Canadian trans-continental lines.

As each year goes by, although for some months it is closed by ice, it will become more and more during the open season a main channel by which the produce of the granaries of Western Canada will reach the British Isles, for it is both a water (ant therefore the cheapest) channel, and the shortest channel.

The River St. Lawrence, rising not far from the source of the Mississippi,¹ enters Lake Superior as the "St. Louis"; between Lakes Superior and Huron, rushing with a rapid current, it becomes the "Sault Ste. Marie"; between Lakes Huron and St. Clair, the "St. Clair"; between Lakes St. Clair and Erie, the "Detroit"; between Lakes Erie and Ontario, the "Niagara," pouring over the Niagara Falls; between Lake Ontario and the Atlantic, the "St. Lawrence." But geographically it is the one great river St. Lawrence.

Canada is largely a country of wood, river, and lake, and it may assist to convey the idea of the extent and volume of fresh water along the southern frontier of the Dominion (including the American lakes of Champlain and Michigan) to say that it amounts to "one-half of the fresh water of the globe."²

The St. Lawrence, except from about December to April, when ice closes it, is navigable for ocean steamers as high up as Montreal.³ The great lakes also, though some of their shallows and bays are in winter frozen over, remain in their central portion open water throughout the year, and their size admits of fleets manœuvring upon their surface.

"Fresh water," exclaims Kipling, "has no right, as it does here, to roar in on mud and sand beaches, between vast headlands, that run out for leagues into haze and sea-fog."⁴

The larger Canadian lakes of Superior, Huron, Erie, and Ontario—the two first of which have a surface area approaching to that of Ireland—vary in length and breadth, as can be seen from the map. The measurements of their circuits, following the sinuosities of the coastline, are given thus in the National Encyclopædia, or Dictionary of Universal Knowledge: Superior, 1,740 miles; Huron, 1,000 miles; Erie, 658 miles; and Ontario, 467 miles. The mean depth of the most shallow is 84 feet.

Thus, were it not that the lakes and the greater part of the St. Lawrence are of fresh, and not salt, water, Canada would be for three-fourths of her entire circumference sea-girt, and she is to that extent water-girt.

Of that eastern portion of her southern boundary which comprises the great lakes it is, for defence purposes, to be noted that towards both flanks lie the American lakes of Champlain on the east and Michigan on the west; also that at the western end of Lake Erie the boundary turns northward, at a right angle, through Lake Huron, so that the possession of ascendancy upon that lake (Huron) lays the flank and rear of Upper Canada open to attack.

Lastly, that the United States territory of Michigan forms the western shore of Lake Huron, to which lake access is gained from Lake Michigan through the Straits of Mackinac.¹

But there are two special features affecting defence to be noticed in connection with this water frontier.

One is that the St. Lawrence, although below Quebec it varies from ten miles to thirty miles in width, narrows above it to two miles, and in places to much less.¹ It is interrupted by rapids and waterfalls at certain points, such as by the rapids and falls of Sault St. Marie between Lakes Superior and Huron, by the rapids and falls of Niagara, and the rapids between Kingston and Montreal. All these, however, are now turned by canals,² which are being steadily deepened, so that large ocean-going vessels of over 10,000 tons burthen, which can now navigate the upper lakes, will ultimately be able, without breaking bulk, to bear freight from Lake Superior to Great Britain and Europe.

The other is, to quote from Dr. Parkin,³ that "for some months of every year an icy finger-thrust from the North touches these waterways, and all navigation (i.e. through navigation) ceases."

The St. Lawrence and the canals between lake and lake become frozen over, ports may be closed by ice, and vessels cannot ascend from the sea. Then, to all intents and purposes, as far as defence is concerned, this water frontier becomes in parts a land one. Moreover, at all seasons, with the artillery and small arms of the present day, the Canadian and American shores are at points of it within effective range of each other, while more than one important bridge¹ spans the St. Lawrence.

Thus it arises that Canada on her southern frontier, which adjoins that of the United States, has, even along the water portion of it, several stretches of country requiring for their defence a strong land force as well as a naval one, and these stretches border very important cities. In addition, she has a land frontier from Lake Superior westward to the Pacific for many hundred miles.

Therefore it seems that the natural character of her frontier throughout indicates this:

First, that for the protection of her extended stretches of ocean, inland sea, lake, and river, and her water-borne commerce, Canada needs above all things naval power; and this is strengthened by the fact that the country, comprising the silver and mineral districts between the southern shore of Hudson Bay and the great lakes, will (as we have said) within a few years be opened up. It will soon be traversed by rail from north to south, as well as from east to west, and the defence of that bay and of Hudson Straits will become a question to be taken into account.

Next, that at the present day some portion other this naval power, whether embodied in the war-vessels of Canada or of Great Britain—if it is to have any certain access before an enemy to the Atlantic ports, Montreal, or the Pacific ports, or trough the easily-obstructed canals to the great lakes—must not at the outbreak of war be at any distance from the Canadian frontier.

Further, that for the security of that frontier Canada requires, in addition to naval power, a land force, which, owing to the increasing extent of her territory to be defended and its growing importance, must be one of considerable strength; and

Lastly, that from the nature of her southern boundary along the water portion of it, the land force for its defence must be one working always in very close concert with the navy.

The reference made to the southern frontier of Canada adjoining the United States of America leads us to emphasize here that the view under which we are now writing is not that anything is likely to disturb the friendly relations existing with that Power.

On the contrary, it is because Great Britain, Canada, and the United States are on their present cordial footing of friendship, as well as that they understand each other's aspirations and feelings fully, and that of late years so many citizens of the United States, crossing the frontier, have become good citizens of Canada and made the Dominion their home, that it becomes now both possible and desirable to write unreservedly as to Canadian defence.

It may, indeed, under the national combinations of the future, though these are too uncertain to discuss, be very important to the United States that the frontier of Canada should not lie too open to attack; and Great Britain and America appear intended, for many reasons, to be closely united in friendship; but, however this may be, every Government and every nation has its own duties to perform, and one is to prepare for the defence of its frontier if attacked, no matter by whom.

How severe a condemnation would be justly passed by any court of law or equity upon a trustee—and Governments are national trustees—who neglected to safeguard a ward's interest, even from the closest friends, upon the ground that the cordial relations which prevailed made it unnecessary. And for a Government to put aside preparation for national defence upon any such pretext, is quite as unjustifiable towards a nation.

It is most improbable that any good is ever done (although harm may be so) by those British subjects, however well-meaning, on both sides of the Atlantic who proclaim to their American cousins that on no account would Great Britain or Canada go to war with America, for their hearers must either doubt their sincerity or sense of honour, and this engenders want of confidence, if not a contempt, which can never promote cordiality. Under certain circumstances America might, and must, go to war with Great Britain, and Great Britain might, and must, go to war with America; but those circumstances, it is hoped, will never now arise.

A frontier left too open to invasion is a fruitful cause of war in itself, and has produced bad feeling between Great Britain and the United States on more than one occasion in the past. It may be said, for instance, that the temptation of an inadequately guarded frontier encouraged the so-called Patriot raids of 1837–38 on the Canadian border, and the Fenian raids of 1866; and, in proportion as that border is known to be efficiently protected, these incidents are in the future less likely to recur.

In these matters it is frankness which most frequently among friends prevents misunderstanding. Mr. Roosevelt, late President of the United States, has in this respect invariably set a good example, and the present President, Mr. Taft, is reported very recently to have said, and most reasonably said, that he himself could see no inconsistency in speaking in favour of peace by arbitration, while also using every effort to obtain from Congress two more battleships yearly till the Panama Canal was opened.¹ Similarly no inconsistency is here felt in anticipating peace with America while discussing what seems desirable for the security of the frontier of her friend and neighbour, Canada.

America must be unavoidably and constantly alluded to merely because she, and no other Power, happens for a long distance to adjoin that frontier, and also because certain lessons in Canadian defence can be learnt only from the war in which she was engaged with Great Britain in 1812–14.