War of 1812 Bicentennial

Chapter III

The war of 1812–14 on the Canadian frontier—Comparatively little known, and why—Its importance and the lessons it teaches—Origin of the war—Situation in Canada when it opened—The respective forces—Naval strength on the lakes—Principal posts—Communications—Strong and weak points on both sides.

We now turn to the war of 1812–14¹ upon the frontier of Canada. It is desirable to draw the attention of military students to this war, the events of which should be more widely known than they are. One reason why they have been comparatively little studied is that from 1808 to 1815 public attention was absorbed by the more engrossing contest which was being fought out with France in Europe upon Peninsular battlefields and elsewhere. Another is that the forces engaged were, when compared with Continental armies, small, and therefore the incidents of the war do not illustrate the larger battle tactics of massed armies of the three arms.

In addition to this, the war was one which, to her great disgust, had been forced upon Great Britain. As Sir Charles Lucas writes,² her "Government and people were loath to enter into it; they were glad to be quit of it; and they willingly tried to forget it."

Nevertheless, it is one teaching many valuable lessons, especially as to the defence of a water frontier of lake and river; the combined action of naval and land forces necessary to maintain it; the importance of early preparation and continuous energy in war; and the disadvantage of a merely passive, as compared with an active, defence.

Many men of capacity and experience have dwelt upon the importance of this war.

Mr. Roosevelt, for instance, writes:¹

"This war should be studied with unceasing diligence. At every step can be seen that great truth that success is only for those who know how to prepare it. . . . As these lakes [those of Ontario, Erie, etc.] were fitted for the manœuvring of ships of the largest size, the operations upon them were of the same nature as those on the ocean."

And Captain Mahan, R.N.:2

"The lake campaigns emphasized the teaching of history as to the influence of the control of the water upon the course of events; although on a small scale, the lakes were oceans, and the forces which met on them were fleets. . . . As in the Civil War half a century later, so in 1812 the power of the water over the issues on land not only was not comprehended by the average official, but was incomprehensible to him. . . . They illustrate the too often forgotten truth that it is by the power of massing superior forces, which the control of these lakes here conferred, that military issues are decided."

Sir C. P. Lucas, also referring to it,¹ writes that the record of its operations is, "in the point of view of military history, full of interest and instruction"; in that of colonial history, "one fruitful of issues of vital importance"; and that it is one to which "the British Empire owes a debt which can never be overestimated."

The contest, lasting for two and a half years, terminated practically in favour of Great Britain, inasmuch that all efforts—and many were made—to conquer Canada, or permanently occupy her soil, were defeated. There were certain reverses, more particularly upon the lake waters, but several victories, some of them commemorated by clasps to the Peninsular War medal, side by side with those for Peninsular battles, and others as battle honours upon the colours and appointments of regiments.²

The determined manner in which forces of British regulars, combined with the local regiments and patriotic militia of Canada, and aided by some loyal Indian warriors,³ could fight, was illustrated again and again.

If there should still remain, as perhaps there does, some truth in what Kingsford, in his History of Canada, wrote some years ago—that "the events of the war of 1812 have not been forgotten in England, for they have never been known there"¹—it would be a satisfaction should this brief reference to what then took place contribute to make them better known.

This account, however, does not purport to be a history of the entire events of the war, but merely such a broad general outline of its more important features as will suffice to make its course and design intelligible, and bring out those points upon which it is, for military reasons, of consequence to dwell.

Before entering, in the next chapter, upon the events of the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, it is desirable to say a few words as to the origin and commencement of the war and the situation on the borders of Canada at that time.

War was officially declared by America against Great Britain on June 18, 1812. It was not a popular one with many of the better class in the United States, nor with all the States of the Union, notably New England and Massachusetts. On the day hostilities were proclaimed several ships in Boston Harbour displayed their flags half-mast high; but this did not prevent the Democratic, or War, Party, which was then dominant in the Senate, from forcing it on, and carrying it by a vote of 193 to 13, while before its declaration troops had been marching towards the Canadian frontier. That frontier was then very inadequately prepared for defence (which of itself encouraged aggression), and it was also believed that the great body of the inhabitants of Canada would make little, if any, resistance, but would welcome the invaders as deliverers from the yoke of Great Britain.

Mr. Jefferson, ex-President of the United States, wrote:¹

"The acquisition of Canada as far as Quebec will be a mere matter of marching, and give us experience for the attack on Halifax, and the final expulsion of England from this continent."

And Mr. Henry Clay said in Congress:

"We have the Canadas as much under our command as England has the sea. I am not for stopping at Quebec, or anywhere else, but I would take the whole continent."

The cause of hostilities can scarcely be defined in a few words, but in essence it was this:

Napoleon, with whom Great Britain was then at war, had, by a decree termed the Berlin Decree, issued in 1806 in order to ruin British commerce, declared all neutral vessels that had touched at a British port liable to seizure. To this Great Britain—having become, since the destruction of the French fleet by Nelson at Trafalgar in 1805, dominant at sea—retaliated by Orders in Council, declaring that no ships which had not touched at a British port should be permitted to enter a French one. Napoleon further declared the British Islands to be in a state of blockade, and prohibited all neutral nations from trading with them, and Great Britain then declared all French ports to be in a state of blockade.

This told severely against the commerce of America (a neutral nation) with France, and the repeal of the Orders in Council was demanded by the United States. There were, moreover, other causes provocatory of war, such as the right claimed by Great Britain to search neutral vessels for deserters from her own service; the sympathy which America entertained for France, who had been her friend in the revolutionary war of 1775–83, and the dislike felt for England as the heritage of that war.

The British Orders in Council were repealed, but this concession did not avert hostilities, which had been declared already, or stay them afterwards.

Great Britain was not prepared for this contest, her hands being already full with the struggle against France; and the few regular troops in Canada, with the Canadian Militia and the flotillas on the lakes, had, in consequence, to conduct the defence of the Canadian frontier for a considerable period without adequate reinforcements of men or matériel of war from the Mother Country.

In population, resources, and armed strength, Canada was at a great disadvantage with respect to her enemy, the country which then constituted Upper Canada (from the River Ottawa westward¹) having only been settled about twenty years before, largely by the United Empire Loyalists.¹ Between the circumstances of Canada and the United States now and then there is a great difference. The Canadian Dominion has now a population of between 7,000,000 and 8,000,000, very rapidly increasing, and a land force of permanent corps and active militia, having a peace establishment of between 50,000 and 60,000, and a war establishment of about double that strength—to be possibly increased to 100,000 in first line and 100,000 in second line, with a reserve of a nominal strength of about 1,000,000.

The United States has, judging by the census of nine years ago, a population of some 90,000,000,² with a land force, largely militia, limited to a peace establishment of 100,000; but capable of great expansion within a few months—possibly to nearly 2,000,000 of trained and untrained men.

But in 1812 Canada had a population estimated at between 300,000 and 400,000 only, of whom 80,000 were in the Upper Province; and the United States one of between 6,000,000 and 8,000,000. Colonel George Denison writes³ that in the war of 1812–14 "300,000 Canadians defended their country against the attacks of a nation of 8,000,000."

Of regular troops, including Canadian fencible regiments, there were in Canada not more than 7,000; of militia, perhaps 15,000; of Indian braves fighting for Canada, about 4,000; the whole of the forces being under Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Governor-General of Lower Canada and Commander-in-Chief, with headquarters at Montreal.

The regular army of the United States numbered about 36,000, and—on paper, at all events—there was a force of militia and volunteers of over 100,000¹

Fortunately, at the opening of the campaign, the command in Upper Canada was held by Major-General (afterwards Sir Isaac) Brock, Lieutenant-Governor of that province, with headquarters at York (Toronto), a man of ability and resource; and of the few armed vessels which were on the Canadian lakes, those under the British flag had complete ascendancy upon the water.

Military equipment and supplies of all kinds had been allowed to dwindle down in Canada to a discreditable extent. General Brock writers thus on February 12, 1812, shortly before hostilities broke out:

"I have not a musket more than will suffice to arm the militia from Kingston westward"; and again on July 3, 1812, after war had been proclaimed: "The King's stores are at so low an ebb that they can scarcely furnish an article of use or comfort."

It should be remarked, as this is not always understood, that the British vessels on the lakes formed no part of the Royal Navy of England. They were ships—schooners, sloops, brigs, etc.—built, bought, or hired by the Canadian Government, and then armed; and they were manned by scratch crews, composed partly of seamen, partly of men accustomed to boats and acquainted with the lakes, and often partly by soldiers (regulars and militia). Nevertheless, they formed the only naval force for the defence of the Canadian southern lake and river frontier; and it was not until after a long delay that a few British naval officers and seamen were sent out to organize, command, and fight in them.

It will give a sufficient idea of their general character and strength to say that when the war opened the British had on Lake Ontario about five¹ armed vessels, mounting in all eighty-four guns; on Lake Erie about the same number, but mounting perhaps fifty guns. On these two lakes the Americans had only an armed brig or two (one being of sixteen guns). On Lakes Champlain, St. Clair, Huron, Superior and Michigan neither side had any armed vessels of consequence.

These were the days of sailing ships, when it frequently took several days working up rivers or crossing the lakes against baffling winds; and the present canals turning the rapids of the St. Lawrence, between the great lakes, were not then in existence, the first to be built being the Rideau Canal, in 1826.¹

There were only some small locks for batteaux at the Cascade, Coteau and Long Sault Rapids (see map facing p. 122), so that cargoes had to be taken out, carted by land, and reloaded beyond these rapids, causing much delay and expense.

Gunboats could not at this period ascend the St. Lawrence into the lakes. They had to be sent out, if at all, in pieces, and put together on their shores.

There were no armed vessels under steam upon the lakes, but a beginning had already been made of introducing steamers (paddle-wheel) upon the rivers. The Accommodation was put on the St. Lawrence by Mr. John Molson in November, 1809, her passage from Montreal to Quebec taking sixty-six hours, during thirty of which she was at anchor; and she was soon followed by others. Between four and five miles an hour was good speed.

As the war went on the naval and military strength of the forces engaged on both sides increased, altering also from time to time; but for the purpose of this account, we need not allude very often to the details of these variations.

The defending army consisted but a mere skeleton force for such an extended border, and was scattered from Quebec, via Montreal (with posts towards Lake Champlain), to York (now Toronto); also along the Niagara frontier, between Lakes Ontario and Erie, and at Amherstburg, near the latter lake, with a post at St. Joseph's, north of Lake Huron, where there was a small work.

Of the principal posts, beginning from the east, it is convenient to mention:¹

Quebec, the ancient Canadian capital, held then, as now, a commanding position upon the St. Lawrence, It was for that period adequately fortified, having been a good deal strengthened between 1807 and 1812, when Sir James Craig was Governor. It was never attacked during the war.

Montreal, at the head of ocean navigation, and the focus of trade between the Upper and Lower provinces, was scarcely fortified at all.

Kingston, the chief military post of Upper Canada, and the naval station on Lake Ontario, with a dockyard, was defended by batteries, blockhouses, and earthworks, and was thus fairly strong.

York (Toronto), the capital of Upper Canada, but then a small place ,was weakly defended by batteries, but the could be easily turned, and thus it was practically an almost open town.

Fort George, at the mouth of the Niagara River, where it enters Lake Ontario, was an earthen work, with at first only a few light guns mounted upon it. Between York and Fort George was a fairly good military position at Burlington Heights, close to Hamilton.

Fort Erie, where the Niagara River issues from Lake Erie, was a work of some strength.

Amherstburg, the naval post (on the River Detroit) for Lake Erie, was protected by a small earthen work (Fort Malden) and some batteries.

On the American side of the frontier (from the east):

Plattsburg, on Lake Champlain, which lies on the most direct route from New York, through Albany, to Montreal, was protected by batteries.

Sackett's Harbour, nearly opposite Kingston, was the American naval station on Lake Ontario, with a dockyard and facilities for building ships. It was protected by earthworks.

Oswego, a fair harbour, lay to the south of it.

Fort Niagara, at the mouth of the Niagara River, was a work of solid construction, mounting some heavy guns, but was to some extent commanded by Fort George opposite.

Fort Schlosser was a small work on the American or east bank of the Niagara, a little higher up than Queenston,¹, on the Canadian side.

Presqu'ile², on Lake Erie, was, after the war had begun, made into the American naval post on that lake, where vessels were built. It was protected by a battery and blockhouse, but it had this disadvantage, that at its entrance was a bar, upon which there was not sufficient depth of water to admit of a large ship built inside being taken over with her guns and stores on board, ready for service. These had to be put on board afterwards on the open lake.

Between this and Pittsburg, in the United States, there was water communication, and to Pittsburg stores were sent from Washington and Philadelphia.

Fort Detroit, on the Detroit River, north of and opposite to Amherstburg, was an important American work, with bastions, a deep ditch, and parapets 20 feet high, mounting thirty-three guns of various calibres. Its situation facilitated the control of the passage between Lakes Erie and St. Clair.

Mackinac (or Michilimackenac), at the north end of Lake Huron, and a trading post, was defended by a small work, and commanded the entrance to Lake Michigan, being not very far from the Canadian post of St. Joseph's, further north.

The British communications along the frontier of Canada by land were at this period most indifferent; and there were, for course, no railways. In the depth of winter it was difficult to carry on military operations with any regularity, for although, when the sleighing was good, military transport could be carried along with comfort, heavy drifts interfered greatly with it, while even the main roads in the spring and during wet weather were deep in mud, very uneven, and unsuitable for the conveyance of heavy warlike stores. The mail took about one month in transit between Montreal and York (Toronto), a distance of some 300 miles. General de Rottenburg, commanding in the Niagara district, writes on July 7, 1813: "The roads have been much neglected, and are the worst I ever saw anywhere."

And Sir G. Prevost writes to Lord Bathurst, on August 14, 1814, that the enemy, having got command of Lake Ontario, "were able to perform in two days what our troops, going from Kingston to reinforce the right division,—i.e. on the Niagara frontier—require from sixteen to twenty of severe marching to accomplish; their men arrive fresh, while ours are fatigued, and with an exhausted equipment. The route from Kingston to the Niagara frontier exceeds 250 miles, and passes in several places through a tract of country impracticable for the conveyance of extensive supplies."1

Therefore, the easiest, best, and occasionally only dependable, communication between the Upper and Lower Provinces was by water, which made it all the more essential to retain naval ascendancy on the St. Lawrence and the lakes, apart from the fact that the chief cities and towns lay on the northern bank of these waters.

The voyage from England to Quebec was usually one of several weeks, but with exceptionally fair winds it was made occasionally much quicker.²

To sum up, when the war opened the prospects of a successful defence of her frontier by Canada were gloomy in the extreme.

The points most in her favour were the spirit of her people, outraged by a war, unprovoked by and forced upon them; the resources of England, with her dominance at sea (although her power was then being heavily strained); the temporary ascendancy of the British flotillas on the lakes (though their strength was but feeble); an also certain weaknesses of her enemy.

These were mainly that the Americans, though they had commenced the war, were not fully prepared themselves for warlike operations; they had misunderstood the views of the bulk of the Canadian people, including the French, and their loyalty to Great Britain; their militia disliked being forced from their homes to fight; discipline was sometimes lax; and few of their officers had experience or recent acquaintance with war.