War of 1812 Bicentennial

Chapter VII

Conclusion

What the preceding chapters indicate—Some points of naval and military defence considered—Importance of a mobile, well-equipped land force—The assistance which such a force may derive from modern science in defence of a water frontier— Aeroplanes, etc.—Value of close concert in naval and military action—Facilities for defence possessed by Canada—Creation, under the Imperial Defence Conference recommendations, of a Canadian Headquarters Section of the Imperial General Staff.

To what nature of defensive measures, then, do the character of the Canadian boundary line, the experience of the war of 1812–14, the views of the Duke of Wellington as to the sine qua non of Canadian defence, the changes affecting defence which have taken place since 1814, the present situation on the lakes, and the circumstances of Canada to-day, seem to point as best adapted to maintain the integrity of the Canadian frontier?

As to this, it must be expected that opinions will vary; but it is proposed in this concluding chapter, and although it must involve occasional repetition of what has been already said, to sum up what is apparently indicated.

In the first place, the dictum of Wellington and his recommendations for the defence of Canada¹ remain in their spirit and in substance as applicable now as when they were written, although, were he alive to-day, he might no doubt have added to them, in consequence of the development of the Dominion since 1814.

It is evident that an enemy with a naval force of fast, well-armed vessels under steam, completely dominant upon the lakes, could continually threaten Canada with invasion at so many points of her southern frontier, that it would keep her defending land forces on a qui vive so perpetual that it would tend to weary out the defence.

Also, that such a naval force would almost certainly have the power in the end to carry through a descent at some point where it might not be possible to concentrate a land force in time sufficient to prevent it; and the hostile warships, if armed with ordnance of greater range and power than the artillery of the land defence, would have the railways along the Canadian water-border, with the undefended cities and towns, under effective fire without danger to themselves, and without landing troops at all.

A defensive land force alone, without support from a naval one upon the lakes, must be from the first most heavily handicapped, and unfairly pitted against an enemy whose ascendancy upon the lake waters had become so established that his war-vessels could traverse them safely and at will from point to point.

Moreover, without naval power on the water boundary, an active, as distinguished from a merely passive (and therefore incomplete), defence of the frontier would become almost impracticable for Canada in the region of the lakes; and for her to yield up voluntarily her power of assuming the offensive in war beyond her water boundary would be to deliberately sacrifice one of the strongest points of her position as regards defence, and ignore the teaching of 1812–14.

Therefore Canada, if the integrity of her southern frontier is to be preserved, cannot afford to-day, any more than she could in 1812–14, to suffer the control of the lakes and the St. Lawrence to pass to an enemy. But such control of the water can never be either obtained or maintained by a land force alone.

Canada also has to make provision for the defence, not of the lake frontier only, but of her Atlantic and Pacific ports; and to provide such a description of defence as will be available the instant war breaks out. It cannot be anticipated that time will be given to receive naval reinforcements from a distance before some hostile blow is struck. Even if the contest should be with a European—i.e., a comparatively distant—naval Power it is clear that "no longer, as in Monroe's time, does a vast Atlantic Ocean separate the Western Continent from Europe. Man's ingenuity has reduced it to a small stream, across which the fleets of European Powers can cross in less time than it took Monroe to post from Washington to Boston."¹

If the contest should be with an enemy on the southern frontier, then the lakes and seaports of Canada may become still more rapidly the scene of hostilities.

Although the British Navy may be able both to watch and account for the main battle fleet of the enemy, it certainly cannot be expected to safeguard the Canadian frontier from invasion during the first weeks, possibly months, of war between Great Britain and a first-class naval Power, not to say two such Powers. That security must at the outset mainly and unavoidably depend upon Canada herself.

Finally, water transport when it can be resorted to remains today in war, in spite of the intro­duction of railways, superior as a carrying power to land transport in many respects.

"The volume of a river's flow is intangible; it cannot be blown up, or, if sufficiently large, be obstructed."¹ In this connection, and from a defensive point of view, it would seem a mistake to permit, as has at times been suggested, the construc­tion for commercial purposes of a barrage completely across the St. Lawrence, with locks on the American side (thus controlling the passage of the river) between Kingston and Montreal—a greater mistake than to sanction the Channel tunnel between England and France.

"The sea,² when free from the enemy's war-ships, offers the best means of communication—not only on account of the speed of modern steamers and their carrying capacity, but from the fact that their lines can be as numerous as are the ports con­trolled on the enemy's seaboard"¹ But neither sea, nor lake, nor river, transport is available in war to any sate extent where there is not naval control of the water. Thus, for Canada naval ascendancy on her sea-coasts, inland waters, and lakes—and especially does this apply to Lake Ontario—cannot con­sistently with the security of her frontier be yielded to any foe. The lakes on her water frontier, if ascendancy upon them is held by her, form a formidable obstacle to an enemy; but if their control is in the hands of that enemy, they become a danger to herself.

As a consequence, an efficient Canadian Navy, as well as British naval power on the ocean, would seem to be essential to an efficient Canadian defence.

Passing on from the subject of naval defence to land defence, it must be borne in mind that Canada is not an island, although from her geographical and strategical position her future (within the Empire) may be that of an important naval Power. She cannot from a naval force alone, whether it be her own or that of Great Britain, obtain that comparative security from sudden invasion which is enjoyed by the British Isles, Japan, Australia, or New Zealand, all countries to attack whose borders an enemy must be brought on ships, and by ships alone. She is also now more vulner­able by land than in 1814, owing to the greater extent of her territory which may become the theatre of war, and to the development, in military resources and power, of possible enemies. Her southern water frontier is in parts so narrow that from the opposite bank it can be com­manded by modern guns, and her southern purely land frontier is of very great length. She might also now, as happened more than once in 1812–14, and in spite of all naval efforts, lose temporarily, at all events, the control of one or more of the lakes. Thus she may be driven by circumstances to rely, and rely mainly, upon her land forces to protect her frontier, especially her southern frontier, with the cities and towns in its vicinity, from aggression. But happily, to counterbalance this, she may hope—should the control of the lakes be unfortunately lost to her—to use those land forces more rapidly, uninterruptedly, and effectively than in the past, because the land communications of Canada have entirely altered in character since 1814.

When the Duke of Wellington wrote his letter of December 22 in that year, so bad at certain periods were the roads which formed these com­munications that, if water transport were interrupted or closed, the land forces suffered very severe distress; they fell short at times of food, equip­ment, and ammunition, and became temporarily unfit to march or carry on concerted military operations.¹ Railways and better roads, provided they can be protected from the enemy, have, at all events, since 1814 modified Canadian land com­munication to the advantage of Canada.

In addition, modern military science makes it comparatively more possible now than formerly for a strong and effective land force alone—i.e., a force well armed, organized, trained, and commanded, with a capable staff, and thoroughly well equipped—to protect a water frontier. This implies, how­ever, that the force must be a light and mobile one, prepared for war, capable of rapid assembly, complete in modern appliances for shore defence, and also in all its various departments, so that it can, on the shortest notice, take and keep the field.

Submarine mines, torpedoes, and other methods of shore defence, are now available, which were not in 1814; and ships can be attacked, under certain circumstances, on the water, from above the water, and under the water, by other engines of war than the guns of opposing vessels.

The balloon, the dirigible airship, and the aero­plane, added to mounted infantry and cyclist corps, form means for ascertaining the position and in­tentions of an enemy, not employed in 1812–14; and the problem has yet to be determined how far a land force of a nation possessing the control of the air may prevent an enemy is ascendancy over the water which washes that nation's shores.¹

Speaking on this subject, a recent writer says:²

"I am not in the least perturbed by the prospect of a great invasion by foreign hosts in airships or on aeroplanes, but I do not think we can exaggerate the importance which the aeroplane will possess in a few years as a means of scouting. . . . On the Canadian frontier, in view of the enormous in­dustrial development of the United States all along the border, I fear the advantage will not be on our side, though it is very satisfactory to see that Canadians are entering keenly and successfully with their kinsmen over the border into competition for the mastery of the air."

In any case, a mobile land force, supported by a good system of shore defense, and in possession of the means for aerial warfare, will be a more awkward foe for war-vessels to encounter than one unprovided with these auxiliaries, and more formid­able on the lake borders than a land force under the circumstances of 1812–14.

One occasionally reads in military works of the advantage which the possession of a so-called "amphibious force" confers upon a nation with free access to the sea, meaning by the word "amphibious"—which is a very far-fetched, though expressive, one—a force composed of seamen and landsmen (navy and army) accustomed to work with each other in defence and offence, by water and by land, and thus aware of each other's weak points which, if lost sight of; may go far to mar their concerted action, and also of their strong points, when combined.

If such a force could be of value anywhere, it should be so upon the water frontier of Canada.

If it be considered that what has been outlined in the preceding pages goes beyond what is practicable, or reasonable, for Canadian defence, the answer must be that what is suggested cannot be acquired in a day or a year; that one is looking forward to what Canada will be five years hence; and that the foundation upon which the super­structure may be built has been already laid under circumstances favourable to its completion,

Canada has at the recent imperial Conference, not only accepted, but willingly risen to her obligations on the score of defense. She has com­menced the organization of her navy, and has on her seacoasts, on her inland waters, and in her maritime population, the material for that navy and also for a Naval Militia (or Volunteer) fleet. She has for the training of her officers the Kingston Military College,¹ and will soon have a naval college. She has her regular local forces, which have taken part in recent wars of the Empire, and require but expansion; she has her military schools and many rifle associations. She can, and does, on her ranches and farms breed horses adapted to and sufficient for all her military wants; she has terri­tories which in forest, lake, and river, afford military training-grounds² for her youth unsurpassed in the world. In that youth she possesses thousands, from the age for boy scouts and cadets onwards, who would be adapted, as they grow up, to form mounted infantry, cyclists' corps, and intelligence corps; who are at home on horseback and with their cycles, in the woods and on the water, with the ride, the gun, and the canoe, and who, if training were added to a natural aptitude for military life, could hold the Canadian frontier against any invader.¹

Lastly, she has in her militia as it exists the principle admitted that everyone is liable to military service for his country, and that national defence is an obligatory duty upon all.²

Lord Kitchener, in his recent official report of February 12, 1910, upon the defence of Australia, writes:

"It must be distinctly recognized that a national force, maintained at a high standard of efficiency, can only be produced by the work of years, and that such work must be steady and continuous. . . . If plans and essential preparations have been deferred until an emergency arises, it will then be found too late to act, because the strain of passing from peace to war will entirely absorb the energies of all engaged, even when every possible con­tingency has been foreseen."

If upon the foundation now existing, the super­structure of organization, training, departmental requirements, and provision of factories for war matériel—a very important want for such a naval and military force as Canada requires for her defence—were begun now, it must be some time before the coping-stone is laid.

Necessarily, of course, the subject of defence must be looked at from the financial as well as from the purely military standpoint; but, fortu­nately, the prosperity of the Dominion is both steadily and rapidly advancing.

The military conscription of the continent of Europe is neither required nor thought of for Canada, or any part of the British Empire; but no one can be blind to the defensive advantages which the organized military training of youth and a modified form of universal service¹ would be to the Dominion, apart from the excellent physical and disciplinary effect (in a moral sense) which it would bring with it. If the full strength of her defensive power were thus put forth, and if, as may be anticipated, the old spirit continues to animate her people, Canada may hope confidently to maintain in war the integrity of her soil.

In respect of resources, population, army and navy, and her position as a member of a powerful Empire, she should at least enter into any future contest under circumstances as favourable, if not more favourable, than those of 1812–14.²

But preparation beforehand is to-day more than ever necessary, and to build up such a naval and military force as would deter any enemy from attempting aggression requires time.

Lord Grey's speech at the prorogation of the Dominion Parliament¹ may well be quoted here:

"I feel as convinced as I am that to-morrow's sun will rise that if you keep true to the highest ideals of duty and disinterested service, nothing can prevent you from becoming, perhaps before the close of the present century, not only the granary, but the heart, soul, and rudder of the Empire."

The foregoing pages may, it is hoped, assist in some degree to draw general attention to the subject of Canadian defence, which, apart from naval or military professional details, has many aspects of much interest to the general public; and to say more here would secure no useful purpose.²

It has been one of the most valuable results of the late Imperial Defence Conference that there is now in Canada a Canadian Headquarters Section³ of the Imperial General Staff, which, in confidential touch on the spot with all that relates to Canadian defence in its many details, will (in communication with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in Great Britain) have to consider those naval and military arrangements which, according to the circumstances of the moment, bear upon the security of the frontier of Canada.

A well-known student of and writer upon Imperial and military questions has recently said:⁴

"In modern times each nation that has made its mark has first made its own tactics. . . . The French revolutionary armies in the first four years of the war against all Europe acquired a suppleness of manœuvre and of tactical judgment which made them for fourteen years superior on every battle­field on which they appeared, except in the Peninsula, where they had to face Wellington, whose tactical judgment was superior to their own."

Canada has already a military history within her own borders, and inherits also the naval and military history of Great Britain and of France. In now entering upon the creation of her own navy and further organizing her defences, she does so under the advantage of recent and valuable suggestions¹ and advice from men who have deeply studied Imperial defence, and have had wide and practical experience of the requirements of war in all quarters of the globe.

Thus the foundation of her defensive system has been well and thoughtfully laid, and justifies the belief that the zeal and patriotism of her people will be so directed in the future upon her training-grounds of sea and lake and land as to develop able naval and military leaders, and such a system of tactics (adapted to her frontiers and forces) as will, through peace or war, increase her prestige as a nation, and maintain her territory an inviolate portion of the British Empire.